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Quantum logical axiomatic systems for quantum theory usually
include a postulate that a lattice under consideration is ortho-
modular. We propose a derivation of orthomodularity from an
information-theoretic axiom. This provides conceptual clarity and
removes a long-standing puzzle about the meaning of orthomodu-
larity.
1 INTRODUCTION
There exist many axiomatic systems from which one derives the formalism
of quantum theory.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Some of these systems employ the
concepts of orthodox quantum logic, i.e. of the theory of orthomodular lat-
tices. For reconstruction of quantum theory, orthomodularity of the lattice
is a necessary, although not a sufficient condition.15 In the axiomatizations it
is commonly postulated or derived from formal assumptions about relations
between elements of the lattice. The work of Beltrametti and Cassinelli is
a notable exception: they give a conceptual justification of orthomodularity.
Namely, they argue that “orthomodularity corresponds to the survival. . . of a
notion of the logical conditional, which takes the place of the classical implica-
tion associated with Boolean algebra”.16 A similar motivation was chosen by
Jauch and Piron, who reformulated orthomodularity as a condition that if a
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proposition is greater than another one in the lattice, then they must be com-
patible, i.e. their span with the operations of join and meet and the orthogonal
complement must give a Boolean algebra.8,17 Although his own motivation of
orthomodularity is different, Drieschner gives a useful shorthand to this idea:
“if x implies y, they have to be compatible”.18 However, to follow Jauch and
Piron, one has to make a substantial intuitive assumption: in order to use
the derivation of orthomodularity via the existence of Boolean subalgebras,
one must separately introduce a notion of compatibility of propositions. It is
clear that compatibility refers to the concept of complementarity in quantum
physics, and thus one uses an intuitive feature motivated by quantum theory,
yet before deriving this theory and for deriving it. Such an early recourse to
the quantum theoretic intuition is certainly an unwelcome factor.
In the present article we give a different conceptual justification of ortho-
modularity of a lattice in the framework of the information-theoretic approach
to quantum theory.19,20,21,22 This approach consists in viewing quantum the-
ory as a theory about, or of, information. Constraints imposed on the kind
of information available in the theory lead then to a particular, rather than
general, theory of information, and one seeks for a set of constraints which
will produce quantum theory. To express the constraints mathematically, a
certain formalism must be employed, e.g. quantum logical23,24 or algebraic.25
In the quantum logical formalism, we show that orthomodularity arises as a
consequence of the following information-theoretic axiom:
Axiom I. There is a maximum amount of relevant information that can be
extracted from a system.
This axiom was first formulated by Rovelli23 who took inspiration from the
work of Wheeler.26,27 Rovelli linked it to the idea of maximal “informational
capacity” of a system and argued informally that Axiom I already adds the
Planck constant to physics. He, however, did not discuss the meaning, nor
treat rigorously, what we take to be the crucial term in the formulation of the
axiom: relevant information. After introducing basic concepts of the theory of
orthomodular lattices in Section 2, we propose in Section 3 a formal definition
of the notion of relevance of information. This leads to a key result in Section 4
in which we prove that the lattice of yes-no questions is orthomodular.
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2 ELEMENTS OF LATTICE THEORY
Lattice L is a partially ordered set in which any two elements x, y have a
supremum x∨y and an infimum x∧y. Equivalently, one can require that a set
L be equipped with two idempotent, commutative, and associative operations
∨,∧ : L × L → L, which satisfy x ∨ (y ∧ x) = x and x ∧ (y ∨ x) = x. The
partial ordering is then defined by x ≤ y if x ∧ y = x. The largest element in
the lattice, if it exists, is denoted by 1, and the smallest one, if it exists, by 0.
Lattice is called complete when every subset of L has a supremum as well
as an infimum. Complete lattice always contains elements 0 and 1. An atom
of lattice L is an element a for which 0 ≤ x ≤ a implies that x = 0 or x = a.
A lattice with 0 is called atomic if for every x 6= 0 in L there is an atom a 6= 0
such that a ≤ x.
Lattice is called distributive if
x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z). (1)
One can weaken the distributivity condition by requiring (1) only if x ≤ z.
Thus, a lattice is called modular if for all y
x ≤ z ⇒ x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ z. (2)
Orthocomplemented lattice is a lattice L which carries orthocomplemen-
tation, i.e. a map x 7→ x⊥, satisfying for all x, y ∈ L the following conditions:
(a) x⊥⊥ = x, (b) x ≤ y ⇔ y⊥ ≤ x⊥, (c) x ∧ x⊥ = 0, (d) x ∨ x⊥ = 1. In an
orthocomplemented lattice hold de Morgan laws
1⊥ = 0; 0⊥ = 1; (x ∨ y)⊥ = x⊥ ∧ y⊥; (x ∧ y)⊥ = x⊥ ∨ y⊥. (3)
By further weakening modularity condition (2), one arrives at the following
definition:
Definition 1. Orthocomplemented lattice L is called orthomodular if con-
dition (2) holds for y = x⊥, that is,
x ≤ z ⇒ x ∨ (x⊥ ∧ z) = z. (4)
3
It is instructive to give the following reformulation of the condition of
orthomodularity,28 for which we offer a new proof.
Lemma 2. An orthocomplemented lattice L is orthomodular if and only if
x ≤ z and x⊥ ∧ z = 0 imply x = z.
Proof. If the lattice is orthomodular, i.e. (4) holds, and if x⊥ ∧ z = 0, then
z = x ∨ 0 = x. To prove the converse, it suffices to show that if the lattice is
not orthomodular then there exist elements x and z such that
x ≤ z, x⊥ ∧ z = 0, x 6= z. (5)
Let us use the notation x < z if x ≤ z and x 6= z. We can then rewrite (5) as
x < z, x⊥ ∧ z = 0. (6)
Assume that the lattice is not orthomodular. In virtue of Definition 1, there
exist elements y and z such that
y ≤ z, y ∨ (y⊥ ∧ z) 6= z. (7)
Now recall that in any lattice holds29
a ≤ b⇒ (c ∧ b) ∨ a ≤ (c ∨ a) ∧ b ∀c. (8)
Put in (8) a = y, b = z, c = y⊥. Follows that
(y⊥ ∧ z) ∨ y ≤ (y⊥ ∨ y) ∧ z. (9)
In the right-hand side replace y⊥ ∨ y by 1, and 1 ∧ z = z. Equation (9) then
takes the form
(y⊥ ∧ z) ∨ y ≤ z. (10)
From equations (10) and (7) one obtains that
(y⊥ ∧ z) ∨ y < z. (11)
On the other hand, from de Morgan laws (3) one has
z ∧ (y ∨ (y⊥ ∧ z))⊥ = z ∧ (y⊥ ∧ (y⊥ ∧ z)⊥) =
z ∧ (y⊥ ∧ (y ∨ z⊥)) = (z ∧ y⊥) ∧ (y ∧ z⊥) =
(z ∧ y⊥) ∧ (z ∧ y⊥)⊥ = 0. (12)
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Now put x = y ∨ (y⊥ ∧ z). Equations (11) and (12) can be rewritten as
x < z, x⊥ ∧ z = 0. (13)
This is exactly what was required in (6).
3 INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH
The fundamental notion of measurement in the information-theoretic approach
is represented as a yes-no question. Information is then brought about in
the answer to a yes-no question. Input of the information-theoretic approach
to the derivation of orthomodularity is therefore limited to the choice of the
departure point: It is a set of yes-no questions that can be asked to the system.
We postulate that this set is an orthocomplemented complete atomic lattice
L, with orthogonal complementation denoting negation of a question.
At the level of ordinary linguistic usage of words, assume that the informa-
tion obtained from a question a is relevant for the observer. We are looking for
ways to make it irrelevant. This can be achieved by asking some new question
b that will make a irrelevant. Consider, for instance, b such that it entails the
negation of a: b → ¬a. If the observer asks the question a and obtains an
answer to a, but then asks a genuine new question b, it means, by virtue of
what “genuine” commonly signifies, that the observer expects either a positive
or a negative answer to b. This, in turn, is only possible if information a is
no more relevant; indeed, otherwise the observer would be bound to always
obtain the negative answer to b. Consequently, we say that that, by asking b,
the observer makes the question a irrelevant. Such considerations of common
linguistic usage of words motivate the following formal definition of relevance.
Definition 3. Question b is called irrelevant with respect to question a if
b∧ a⊥ 6= 0. Otherwise question b is called relevant with respect to question a.
What does Definition 3 mean with regard to the best known lattice, i.e.
the Hilbert lattice or the lattice of all closed subspaces of the Hilbert space?
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Figure 1: Notion of relevance. Order in the lattice is denoted by solid lines
and grows from bottom to top, i.e. 0 ≤ a ≤ b, etc. If there exists c 6= 0 such
that c ≤ b and c ≤ a⊥, then question b is irrelevant with respect to question
a, i.e. in b “is contained a component” of non-a, and consequently, by asking
b, one renders information of the question a irrelevant.
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If x ∈ L is a closed subspace of the Hilbert space H , then its orthogonal
complement x⊥ ∈ L satisfies x ⊕ x⊥ = H and dim x = codim x⊥. Assume,
as on Figure 1, that two Hilbert lattice elements a and b are such that a <
b. Then dim b > dim a and, consequently, there exist closed subspaces of b
not contained in a. Call one such subspace c. In virtue of the definition
of orthogonality, one has a ⊕ a⊥ = H , and this implies that c ∩ a⊥ 6= ∅.
Therefore, b ∧ a⊥ 6= 0. We obtain that if b > a in a Hilbert lattice, then b is
always irrelevant with respect to a. Generally, as follows from Lemma 2 and
Definition 3, in an orthomodular lattice there exist no questions relevant with
respect to a given one, which at the same time are strictly greater than this
question.
Relevance then becomes trivially assimilated to orthogonality in the case
of Hilbert lattices. Any closed subspace c such that c ⊆ a provides a lattice
element c relevant with respect to a, and all other lattice elements are irrelevant
with respect to a. If, for example, one is concerned with the Hilbert space of
spin projections, with respect to σ
x
only operators which commute with it
are relevant, i.e. σ
x
itself and the null projector. The interest in the notion of
relevance is therefore motivated, not by the Hilbert lattices, but by the generic
case where relevance is not a mere reformulation of set-theoretic inclusion and
of the compatibility of propositions. While some theorists deliberately choose
not to cross this limit, the property of orthomodularity can be properly derived
only if one goes beyond the standard Hilbert lattice vision.
An example when the notion of relevance is non-trivial is given on Figure 2.
This is a non-orthomodular complete atomic lattice, in which b is relevant
with respect to a, although b ≥ a holds. In general, there exist infinitely
many non-orthomodular complete atomic orthocomplemented lattices, which
can be for example constructed by slightly violating Greechie’s procedure.30
All such lattices are “wild” from the point of view of quantum theory, and it
is necessary to give an argument excluding them from consideration.
Apart from relevance, another concept mentioned in Axiom I, which ne-
cessitates a formal definition, is the amount of information. In general, when
relevance of information is not preserved throughout several acts of asking
questions, i.e. when, as new information comes in, some older information
ceases to be relevant, it is impossible to dissociate the amount of information
generated by a new question from the considerations of relevance of this new
7
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Figure 2: An orthocomplemented non-orthomodular lattice.
question with respect to the previously asked ones. Influence of every new
question on the total amount of relevant information is therefore contextual:
it depends on which questions have been asked before. It is easy, though, to
define one particular property of the amount of information in an exceptional
case when the contextual dependence disappears. Thus, we assume that the
amount of information is a monotonously growing function of the number of
answers to yes-no questions that the observer obtains, in the exceptional case
when none of the new questions render irrelevant any of the previous ques-
tions. In other words, if the observer keeps all the old information, then the
amount of information grows as new information comes in.
Going back to the phrase in the first paragraph in which we introduced
the set of yes-no questions, we interprete the words “can be asked” so that
one is concerned with possible acts of bringing about information, i.e. the
lattice contains all possible questions, most of which, indeed, will never be
asked. Applied to the amount of information, such a lattice construction leads
to a further assumption that there always are sufficiently many questions as
to bring in, potentially, any amount of information permitted a priori by the
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theory. In particular, there always exists a question such that it brings the
maximum amount of relevant information to be had about the system.
4 ORTHOMODULARITY OF A LATTICE
Axiom I ensures that cases as the one shown on Figure 2 do not appear in
quantum theory, i.e. that all important lattices are orthomodular. This is
achieved in virtue of the following theorem.
Theorem 4. L is an orthomodular lattice.
Proof. By Axiom I there exists a finite upper bound of the amount of relevant
information. Let this be an integer N . Select an arbitrary question a and
consider a question a˜ such that
{a, a˜} (14)
bring the maximum amount of relevant information, i.e. N bits. Notation
{. . .} means a sequence of questions that are asked one after another. Because
all information here is relevant, we have by the definition of relevance that
a˜ ∧ a⊥ = 0. (15)
We now use Lemma 2. It is sufficient to show that a ≤ b and a⊥ ∧ b = 0
imply a = b. Note first that the second condition means, by Definition 3, that
b is relevant with respect to a. Since a ≤ b, we obtain that
b⊥ ≤ a⊥. (16)
Using this result and the result of Equation 15, we derive
a˜ ∧ b⊥ = 0. (17)
This, in turn, means that question a˜ is relevant with respect to b.
Now suppose, contrary to what is needed, that b > a and consider the
following sequence of questions:
{a, b, a˜} (18)
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From Equations 15 and 17 follows that relevance is not lost in this sequence
of question, i.e. all later information is relevant with respect to all earlier
information. However, while relevance is preserved, this sequence, in virtue
of the fact that a 6= b, brings about more information than sequence (14).
It means that we have constructed a setting in which the amount of relevant
information is strictly greater than N bits, causing a contradiction with the
initial assumption. Consequently, a = b and the lattice L is orthomodular.
5 CONCLUSION
Theorem 4 provides a solution to the long-standing puzzle about the mean-
ing of orthomodularity. Historically, orthomodularity appeared at a late stage
of quantum logical research, the first invention being the theory of von Neu-
mann algebras,31 second the theory of von Neumann modular lattices,32 and
only third the theory of orthomodular lattices. Its origin can be traced back
to Husimi’s work in which he was predominantly concerned with deriving
non-Boolean logic from empirical facts,33 and in full orthomodularity was for
the first time discussed much later.34 Thus, appearing as the weakest lattice
constraint and as a result of the historic evolution of quantum logic, ortho-
modularity was easily taken for granted in axiomatization attempts. Reviving
recently the interest in quantum logic, information-theoretic approach permits
to bridge this conceptual gap. From the information-theoretic viewpoint or-
thomodularity must be seen as a consequence of the finite amount of relevant
information.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The initial idea of proof of Lemma 2 is due to Prof. V. A. Franke. Many
thanks to Carlo Rovelli and Jeffrey Bub for their insightful comments.
10
References
1. G.W. Mackey Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Ben-
jamin, New York, 1963).
2. N. Zieler “Axioms for non-relativistic quantum mechanics.” Pacific J.
Math. 11, 1151–1169 (1961).
3. V.S. Varadarajan Geometry of Quantum Theory (Van Norstand, Prince-
ton, 1968).
4. C. Piron Foundations of Quantum Physics (Benjamin, Reading, 1976).
5. S. Kochen and E.P. Specker “Logical structures arising in quantum the-
ory,” in Addison J. et al., eds., The Theory of Models (North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1965).
6. J. Guenin “Axiomatic formulations of quantum theories,” J. Math. Phys.
7, 271–282 (1966).
7. J. Gunson “On the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics,” Comm.
Math. Phys. 6, 262–285 (1967).
8. J.M. Jauch Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley, Read-
ing, 1968).
9. J.C.T. Pool “Baer ∗-semigroups and the logic of quantum mechanics,”
Comm. Math. Phys. 9, 118–141 (1968).
10. R.J. Plymen “A modification of Piron’s axioms,” Helvetica Physica Acta
41, 69–74 (1968).
11. M.J. Maczynski “On a functional representation of the lattice of projec-
tions on a Hilbert space,” Studia Mathematica 47, 253–259 (1973).
12. A.R. Marlow “Orthomodular structures and physical theory,” In A.R.
Marlow, ed., Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory (Academic
Press, New York, 1978).
11
13. S.S. Holland “Orthomodularity in infinite dimensions; a theorem of M.
Sole`r,” Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 32, 205–234 (1995).
14. G.T. Ru¨ttimann “Projections on orthomodular lattices,” In
A. Hartka¨mper and H. Neumann, eds., Foundations of Quantum Mechan-
ics and Ordered Linear Spaces (Springer, Berlin, 1974).
15. H.A. Keller “On the lattice of all closed subspaces of a hermitian space,”
Pacific J. Math. 89, 105–107 (1980).
16. E.G. Beltrametti and G. Cassinelli The Logic of Quantum Mechanics
(Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1981).
17. C. Piron “Axiomatique quantique,” Helvetica Physica Acta 36, 439–468
(1964).
18. M. Drieschner “Lattice theory, groups and space,” In L. Castell, M. Dri-
eschner, and C.F. von Weizsa¨cker, eds., Quantum Theory and the Struc-
tures of Time and Space (Carl Hansen, Mu¨nchen, 1975).
19. J.A. Wheeler “World as system self-synthesized by quantum networking,”
IBM J. Res. Develop. 32, 4–15 (1988).
20. C.A. Fuchs “Quantum foundations in the light of quantum information,”
In A. Gonis and P.E.A. Turchi, eds., Decoherence and its Implications in
Quantum Computation and Information Transfer (IOS Press, Amsterdam,
2001).
21. C. Brukner and A. Zeilinger “Information and fundamental elements of
the structure of quantum theory,” In L. Castell and O. Ischebeck, eds.,
Time, Quantum, Information (Springer, Berlin, 2003).
22. A. Grinbaum “Elements of information-theoretic derivation of the formal-
ism of quantum theory,” International Journal of Quantum Information
1, 289–300 (2003).
23. C. Rovelli “Relational quantum mechanics,” Int. J. of Theor. Phys. 35,
1637 (1996).
12
24. A. Grinbaum The Significance of Information in Quantum Theory (PhD
thesis, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, 2004).
25. R. Clifton, J. Bub, and H. Halvorson “Characterizing quantum theory in
terms of information-theoretic constraints,” Found. Phys., 33, 1561–1591
(2003).
26. J.A. Wheeler “Information, physics, quantum: the search for the links,”
In Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics (Tokyo, 1989).
27. J.A. Wheeler “It from bit,” In L. Keldysh and V. Feinberg, eds., Sakharov
Memorial Lectures on Physics, Vol. 2 (Nova Science, New York, 1992).
28. G. Kalmbach Orthomodular Lattices (Academic Press, London, 1983).
29. P.M. Cohn Universal Algebra (Harper and Row, New York, 1965).
30. R.J. Greechie “Orthomodular lattices admitting no states,” Journal of
Combinatorial Theory A 10, 119–132 (1971).
31. F.J. Murray and J. von Neumann “On rings of operators,” Ann. of Math.
37, 116–229 (1936).
32. G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann “The logic of quantum mechanics,” Ann.
Math. Phys. 37, 823–843 (1936).
33. K. Husimi “Studies in the foundations of quantum mechanics,” Proceed-
ings of the Physico-Mathematical Society of Japan 19, 766–789 (1937).
34. L.H. Loomis The Lattice Theoretic Background of the Dimension Theory
of Operator Algebras (American Mathematical Society, Providence, 1955).
13
